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The last two decades of public sector reform have ushered in a new paradigm of 
client-citizens expecting better governmental performance at lower costs. Two distinct, 
but not unconnected, forces have been at the heart of this transformation: the drive 
towards applying “New Public Management” (NPM) techniques in public sector 
administration, and the shift to a “Governance” view in rule making and political action. 
The City of Austin has been at the forefront of these movements, and The City Auditor’s 
Office (COA) rests at their nexus.  This report is a study of the City Auditor Integrity 
Unit (CAIU), the investigative arm of COA, and more specifically, the CAIU’s system of 
performance measurement.  The report explores the challenges of designing and using a 
performance measurement system within CAIU to achieve more socially optimal 
outcomes for the City of Austin.  The analysis in the report draws on a number of 
theoretical perspectives, most significantly on Complex Adaptive Theory (CAS). 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The last two decades have seen a wave of public sector reforms that have changed 
the face of public administration.  They have helped transform how citizens view their 
government and have changed the way that government does business, ushering a new 
paradigm of client-citizens expecting better performance at lower costs. Two distinct, but 
not unconnected, forces have been at the heart of this transformation: the drive towards 
applying “New Public Management” (NPM) techniques in public sector administration, 
and the shift to a “Governance” view in rule making and political action.  NPM, inspired 
by a mix of private sector management philosophies, has relied on market ideas of 
efficiency, entrepreneurship and a focus on continuous improvement, whereas  
“Governance” approaches have applied a more holistic and social lens to the challenges 
facing their communities.  While performance measurement lies at the heart of NPM, an 
effective Internal Audit, Ethics and Compliance system is a cornerstone of Good 
Governance.  The City of Austin has been at the forefront of these movements, and The 
City Auditor’s Office rests at their nexus. 
My report is a study of the investigative unit of the Auditor’s Office of the City of 
Austin, where I have been working since June 2010, and more specifically, the Unit’s 
system of performance measurement.  My research study is concerned with how 
measures can be improved to create more socially optimal outcomes for the City of 
Austin.  As the non-criminal investigative branch of the City Auditor’s Office, the City 
Auditor’s Integrity Unit (CAIU) is a key facet of a structure intended to promote 
effectiveness and efficiency of City government.   The Unit serves to safeguard taxpayer 
assets and plays a pivotal role in maintaining the ethical standards of the organization as a 
 2 
whole.  Its performance impacts the efficacy of the City at large, and therefore makes for 
a particularly interesting case study.    
The Good Governance Movement 
 “Governance,” traditionally has referred to the general purpose and function of 
government, most commonly seen as “the exercise of authority, control, management, 
power of government.”1 However, in the context of this paper, the “Governance” 
movement refers to sociopolitical paradigm shift, which has over the last several decades, 
sought to expand the role and definition of government.  “Good governance” is a term 
most often used in the development literature, but has also found a place here at home.  
Today it has increasingly come to signify that government should be responsible to the 
people it serves.2 This responsibility is most often framed in the moral language of ethics 
and accountability.  Since a responsible use of resources is one facet of Good 
Governance, the two movements, Good Governance and NPM, have often overlapped.  
There are other aspects to Governance, which are important to our study.  For instance, 
Good Governance thinkers tend to view government as one actor in a broader network of 
actors responsible for the overall management of community resources.  
New Public Management and Managing For Results 
 If the Governance approach aims to change the role of government in our society, 
than “New Public Management” (NPM) could be thought to be one of the agents by 
                                                
1 Guy Leclerc, W. D.-P. (1996). Accountability, Performance Reporting, Comprehensive Audit: An 
Integrated Perspective. Ottowa: CCAF-FCVI, p. 9. 
2 Tony Bovaird, E. L. (Ed.). (2003). Public Management and Governance. London: Routledge, p. 10. 
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which that change is carried out.3 It emphasizes the need for greater efficiency in 
government through more effective budgeting techniques and the sound use of data.  
Under this paradigm, private sector techniques are applied to the management of public 
resources and citizens come to be viewed as customers of public service to whom the 
public managers must stand constantly accountable. Whereas NPM is the academic term 
used to describe the rationale behind the set of reforms seen in the Western world over 
the last several decades, “Managing for Results,” of MFR, describes its practical 
application.  MFR is a process which mandates first, the collection of relevant indicators 
of operational effectiveness and efficiency, or performance measures, and second, the use 
of that data to make better management decisions.  In other words, MFR is a component 
of NPM.  Whereas NPM is more of an academic framework, MFR is one of the political 
means by which it has been carried out.  The term “Performance Measurement,” as it 
used today, refers to one of the vital processes of the Results-Based Management 
approach.   
Performance Measurement: Historical Perspectives 
 Performance measurement, or the gathering of operational data to inform 
decision-making, is hardly a new phenomenon.  Some trace the history of modern 
performance measurement as far back as the 1930s, when New York Mayor Fiorello La 
Guardia used public health outcome data from major cities around the United States to 
choose a health director for his administration.4  The “Whiz Kids”’ (a cohort of former 
                                                
3 Walt, J. A. (2001). Theories of Governance and New Public Management: Links to Understanding 
Welfare Policy Implementation. Annual conference of the American Society for Public Administration. 
Newark.  
4 Walters, J. (1998). Measuring Up: Governing's Guide to Performance Measurement for Geniuses (and 
Other Public Managers), p. 9. 
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RAND analysts led by Robert McNamara) use of sophisticated data and computing 
systems to optimize operations in the 1960s and 1970s, first at Ford and then at the 
Department of Defense, is also an important milestone in the story of performance 
measurement. The accounting profession would also have something to say about their 
contribution; it started its advocacy for the use of Service Efforts and Accomplishments 
(SEA) in public budget reporting in the 1970s.5   
However, it wasn’t until the early 1990s, with the release of David Osborne and 
Ted Gaebler’s Reinventing Government, that performance measurement became a 
mainstay in government.  In 1993, as a result of The National Partnership for Reinventing 
Government (NPR), a taskforce spanning multiple agencies, (first known as the National 
Performance Review), the Clinton administration released “From Red Tape to Results: 
Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less,” a report which contained as 
many as 384 recommendations to reinvigorate government performance on the federal 
level.6  That same year, NPM made its indelible mark in the federal sphere with the 
passage of the Government Performance and Results Act “GPRA” or “The Results Act,” 
which mandated federal agencies to develop strategic plans showcasing output- and 
outcome-related goals and the annual reporting of progress towards those goals’ 
achievement.     
The GPRA entrenched the concept of measuring for results, which has since taken 
on many names, including “Performance Management, Managing for Results (MFR), 
                                                
5 SEA Performance Information: Proposed Guidelines for Voluntary Reporting. (2009, June 30). 20 (2)., 
http://www.ijpis.net/issues/no1_2010/IJPIS_no1_2010_p7.pdf, pg. 112. 
6 (1995). Building Lasting Reform. In D. F. Kettle, & J. J. Diludio (Eds.), Reinvention Machine (pp. 9-83). 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, p. 2. 
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Performance-Based Management, Activity-Based Management, etc.,”7 all of which 
include the measurement of performance as an essential component.  Managing for 
Results (MFR) is a process intended to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public 
programs and institutions by emphasizing strategic planning and performance 
measurement and reporting, and by tying budgeting to outcomes.   
Public entities on the state and local level have also been experimenting with 
MFR over the last several decades, employing various models and methodologies.8   
Performance Measurement Under an MFR Framework 
  
Over time, a body of “best practices” literature has evolved for the design and 
reporting of measurement information in the context of results-based management.  
David Ammons, a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and a 
renowned expert on performance measurement in municipal government, has advocated 
for measures to be “valid, reliable, understandable, timely, resistant to undesired 
behavior, sensitive to data collection costs, and focused on important facets of 
performance.”9  The use of measurement to “inspire managerial thinking” has also been a 
recent focus in the field of managing for performance.10  Hary P. Hatry, for instance, 
another influential leader in the MFR movement, has written extensively about ways to 
make performance measurement information useful for the decision maker.   
                                                
7 (2010). Retrieved May 6, 2010, from Service Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting for Government: 
http://www.seagov.org/aboutpmg/managing_for_results.shtml 
8 Paul D. Epstein, S. S. (2004). Auditor Roles in Government Performance Measurement: A Guide to 
Exemplary Practices at the Local, State, and Provincial Levels. The Institute of Internal Auditors, p. 16. 
9 Ammons, D. N. (2007). Performance Measurement: A Tool for Accountability and Performance 
Management. County and Municipal Government in North Carolina, p. 5 
10 Ibid. 
 6 
Most recently, the MFR movement has turned to setting standards in the reporting 
of performance information.  In June of 2009, The Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB) promulgated voluntary guidelines for service efforts and 
accomplishments (SEA) performance reporting on the state and local level.11  These 
guidelines aim to both “assist users in assessing governmental accountability and making 
economic, social, and political decisions” as well as “assist governments in 
demonstrating their accountability and stewardship over public resources.”12 
 The most current thinking in the performance management field advocates for 
richer “discussion and analysis of results and challenges” or what Hatry and others have 
called “explanatory information” as a vital component of effective reporting. 13  In June 
2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided guidance on the GPRA.  In 
an attempt to move beyond reporting, OMB outlines strategies for more effective 
utilization of performance indicator data for decision making, and discusses the issues of 
communicating performance information as well as “strengthening problem-solving 
networks, inside and outside government, to improve outcomes and performance 
management practices.”14 
                                                
11 Judith A. Sage, L. G. (2010). New Guidelines for Service Efforts and Accomplishments Reporting in the 
United States. International Journal of Public Information Systems , 2010 (1), 111-119. 
12 SEA Performance Information: Proposed Guidelines for Voluntary Reporting. (2009, June 30). 20 (2), 
pg 5. Austin City Connection. (2011). Retrieved May 6, 2011, from Performance Measures: 
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/budget/eperf/index.cfm 
13 Hatry, H. (1999). Performance Measurement: Getting Results. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 
p. 112-113. 




MFR’s Implementation in Austin 
The City of Austin has a fairly long history of using data collection in its 
assessment of performance. Performance measures were first introduced in the City’s 
budget as early as 1970.15  The City of Austin’s system is based on a Results-Based 
Management framework, which attempts to tie performance measures with departmental 
goals and objectives as part of an annual business planning process.  The City aims to use 
these measures to “sustain service levels, strive for excellence and continued 
improvement.”16   
The City of Austin provides the following explanation of performance 
measurement to its citizens: 
“These performance measures provide a map of the annual expectations 
for each department. Performance measures provide departmental staff 
and management critical operating information; they provide City 
Management key decision-making information for resource allocation, 
process improvements and other management decisions; additionally, they 
provide the City Council comprehensive data on each department's 
primary operating functions.”17 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Office of the City Auditor played a 
significant role in ensuring that the City of Austin stayed on the leading edge of the 
evolution of NPM. During those years, OCA conducted a series of citywide performance 
measurement-related audits.  When its findings shed light on the “significant gaps in the 
use and reporting of performance,” OCA recommended that City Council send a stronger 
                                                
15 (2010). City of Austin Annual Performance Report, 2009-2010. Austin: City of Austin Budget Office. 




message about the importance of measurement to City Management.18  As a result, in 
1992, a Council Resolution was adopted to the end of measuring and reporting 
performance.”19   
Department performance measures were revisited by OCA in 1992, 1994, 1998 
and 2002. 20  Recommendations from these audits were passed on the Council and were 
geared at improving the effectiveness of departmental performance measurement 
systems.21   
In October 2010, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) 
recognized the City of Austin with a Certificate of Excellence.  It was recognized for 
“exceeding” ICMA standards “in the identification and public reporting of key outcome 
measures, surveying of both residents and employees, and the pervasiveness of 
performance measurement in the organization’s culture.”22   
Resistance to MFR 
MFR has had its fair share of dissenters.  Many have argued against both the 
equity and utility of evaluating public servants based on the achievement of results 
against predetermined targets.  Some think it unjust for government workers to be held 
accountable for their achievements, when they must answer to multiple, and sometimes 
conflicting constituencies.23   
                                                
18 Paul D Epstein; Stuart S Grifel; Stephen L Morgan. (2004). Auditor Roles in Government Performance 
Measurement: A Guide to Exemplary Practices at the Local, State, and Provincial Levels. Altamonte 




22 (2010). City of Austin Annual Performance Report, 2009-2010. Austin: City of Austin Budget Office. 
23 Callahan, K. (Ed.). (2007). Elements of Effective Governance: Measurement, Accountability and 
Participation. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, p. 5. 
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Others stress the potential for MFR to actually undermine public entity 
performance through the creation of perverse incentives.  They point out that highlighting 
certain targets, over others may motivate government servants to only shoot for the 
targets that they know they can reach.24  Since “desired outcomes” are very difficult to 
define, and appropriate targets hard to set, some skeptics posit that valuable time and 
resources would better be spent on actually trying to improve results in government, as 
opposed to reporting them.   
Report Rationale 
The idea for my study originated from a business need within the Auditor’s Office 
to review the “effectiveness and efficiency” measures currently in use within the Unit.  
However, in attempting to find recommendations for potential improvements to the 
measures of performance, many other questions first had to be answered.  Namely, what 
is the purpose of measurement?  What does “good performance” mean in the public 
sector in general, and in fraud units in particular?  What are the assumptions underlying 
the design, implementation and reporting of performance measures?  Finally, what is the 
broader historical and political context within which the Integrity Unit’s measurement 
system exists?   
In Chapter I, will first provide a historical context measuring performance in the 
public sector, and will explain how the concept has evolved over the last several decades.  
It will also provide a discussion of how the City of Austin has embraced the reform 
movement. Chapter II will introduce the theoretical frameworks for framing the analysis 
that will follow in the rest of the report.  Chapter III will consider CAIU within the wider 
                                                
24 Ibid, pg. 7 
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Ethics framework.  Chapter IV will present a ground level view of CAIU performance 
priorities, and Chapter V will attempt to synthesize theories with reality to provide 
recommendations and concluding thoughts.   My report will attempt to explore some of 
the more interesting and perplexing aspects of performance measurement in order to gain 
a better understanding of how, and perhaps even whether, performance measurement can 




Chapter II: Performance Measurement: Organizational Theory 
Perspectives 
Performance measurement in both the private and public sectors has been 
motivated by various underlying assumptions.  On the one hand, measurement is guided 
by the belief that tracking operational data will enable organizations to make more 
informed financial, policy and process decisions.  On the other, it is thought that setting 
targets, and tying them to incentives, will motivate employees towards more productive 
and successful work.  It is my argument that the design and use of performance 
measurement systems is implicitly informed by views of the organization and the 
environment in which it operates.  After a brief introduction into the traditional approach 
to organizations, this chapter will offer an alternative framework for analyzing 
organizational performance.   
Traditional Approaches to Organizations 
Until recently, organizations were typically conceptualized as hierarchical 
structures of top-down administration, both in the private and the public context.  Max 
Weber, a German sociologist, for instance, was highly influential in disseminating this 
view with regards to government bureaucracy in the beginning of the 20th century.  This 
view rested on an assumption of linearity and rationality: appropriate inputs of effort 
were believed to produce predictable and proportional results.  Since then, there has been 
a substantial move towards decentralization in the corporate world.  In the public sector, 
the Governance movement, as well as NPM, has advocated for dissolving rigid Weberian  
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bureaucracies and empowering the people to take ownership of their government.25  
However, with the establishment of accountability structures, as in the case of public 
sector performance measurement, one might ask:  has the fundamental view of the 
organization really changed?  As some proponents writing in a post-NPM context have 
emphasized, we have seen a redirection of authority, from a top-down to a bottom-up 
system of control.26   
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory 
A diverging school of thought believes that the traditional approach to 
organizations, outlined above, is based on a flawed assumption of rationality and 
control.27   Influenced by the fields of complexity science, chaos theory and evolutionary 
biology, complex adaptive system (CAS) theorists view organizations as dynamic 
systems where relationships between agents are nonlinear and ever changing.28  A CAS is 
characterized by a set of common properties, which will be explained below. 
CAS theorists look to insights from post-Newtonian physics to compare 
biological systems to those that exist in the social world.  They claim that spontaneous 
reorganization of particles, or in the social case, the self-organization of actors within a 
system, allows agents to adapt to their environment.29  These agents adapt by being able 
to "make sense” of their surroundings and learn from that exchange.   Complex adaptive 
                                                
25 Gregory, R. (2007). New Public Management and the Ghost of Max Weber: Exorcized or Still 
Haunting? In P. L. Tom Christensen (Ed.), Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of 
Public Sector Reforms (p. 222).  
26 (1995). Building Lasting Reform. In D. F. Kettle, & J. J. Diludio (Eds.), Reinvention Machine 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, p. 68 
27 McDaniel, R. R. (2004). Chaos and Complexity in a Bioterrorism Future. In M. F. John Blair, 
Bioterrorism Preparedness, Attack and Response (Advances in Health Care Management) (Vol. 4, pp. 119-
139). Emerald Group Publishing Limited, p. 125. 
28 Ibid, p. 122 
29 Prigogine, I. (2005). The Rediscovery of Value and the Opening of Economics. In K. Dopfer, The 
Evolutionary Foundations of Economics (pp. 59-69). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 13 
systems are also characterized by non-linear relationships, or interdependencies, between 
agents that lead to what are called “emergent” properties within organization.  However, 
the higher the number of interdependencies, the more diverse the set from which potential 
properties may emerge.30  It is important to note that self-organization can just as well 
lead to maladaptation, as positive outcomes.  CAS theorists conclude that it is namely the 
quality of interconnections that have a bearing on the quality of the emergent properties 
within a system.31   
Viewing organizations from a complexity perspective has several implications for 
performance measurement.  The first involves the non-linear nature of relationships 
between inputs and outputs.  CAS thinkers suggest that there is at best be a “loose 
coupling between actions and market payoffs” 32 for organizational units and suggest two 
distinct reasons, which are particularly relevant to our discussion.  The first is the time lag 
that may occur between an action and its impact on the surrounding environment. 33 The 
second, “spatial” component involves the interdependence of actors within a system, 
where “the payoff to the actions of one element of the organization may be dependent on 
the actions of other elements of the organization.”34  In other words, the unpredictability 
                                                
30 Rivkin, J. W., & Siggelkow, N. (2002). Organization Sticking Points on NK Landscapes. Wiley 
Periodicals , 7 (5), pp. 31-43. 
31 McDaniel, R. R. (2004). Chaos and Complexity in a Bioterrorism Future. In M. F. John Blair, 
Bioterrorism Preparedness, Attack and Response (Advances in Health Care Management) (Vol. 4, pp. 119-
139). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
32 Daniel A. Levinthal, M. W. (1999, May-June). Landscape Design: Designing for Local Action in 




of the “recursive feedback loops” that occur in a dynamic system make it very difficult to 
know which factors caused the final outcomes.35   
Another potentially important contribution to the study of performance from the 
CAS field involves the consideration of “fitness landscapes” in organizational design.  A 
fitness landscape can be conceived to be the map of the incentive structures of individual 
agents within a system, and these payoff structures can be seen as mountains on a 
landscape.  On this landscape, agents are climbing their own fitness peaks to maximize 
their gain.   However, the landscape is constantly shifting, as actions and reactions 
change the payoff structures of individual actors, and therefore a person’s individual 
payoffs are constantly changing as well.   
As mentioned earlier, agents within the system are presupposed to have an ability 
to self-organize, or to find ways around formal hierarchical structures.  In the context of 
City government for instance, the idea of self-organization suggests that agents may find 
ways to communicate outside of scheduled meetings to complete needed tasks.  CAS 
theory also emphasizes that organizations not only adapt to their environments, but also 
help shape its evolution.  This is seen as a process which becomes more dynamic as 
entropy, or the flow of information through a system, increases.  In a practical case, one 
can look to the City Auditor’s Office as an agent in the City of Austin’s complex adaptive 
system.  The release of an audit report, for instance, can have multiple unexpected 
repercussions as audit findings are filtered through departments, the media, City Council 
and Management and citizen groups.  Based on the diverse reactions to the information 
released, agents will take action based on respective perceived needs and priorities.   This 
                                                
35 Talbot, C. (2010). Theories of Performance: Organizational and Service Improvement in the Public 
Domain. New York City: Oxford University Press, p. 49. 
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will lead to changes in the City landscape through potential policy changes or shifts in 
attitude and even through changes in departmental interactions.  These effects will 
combine in unpredictable ways to change the fitness landscape of the Audit office. It is to 
this new landscape that the Office will now have to adapt.   
An analysis of payoff structures from the point of view of complexity helps us 
gain a deeper understanding of the challenges inherent in designing a system of 
performance measurement.  Design theorists contend that incentive structures are only as 
effective as their fit to the actual landscape within an organization, and that systems such 
as the balanced scorecard approach may be create “dysfunctional” patterns of behavior.36   
The CAS approach places emphasis on the changing nature of relationships 
within a system37 and advocate for more “mindful” and “careful” interactions with other 
actors.38  CAS theorists also emphasize the concept of “sensemaking,” which can be 
thought of constant awareness and critical thought about the changing organizational 
context and system dynamics in which one operates.   To navigate in a world of 
instability and uncertainty, CAS theorists emphasize richer exchanges of information and 
more frequent communication to facilitate the ability to both make sense of, and to learn 
from, their constantly changing environment.  
 This chapter has provided a discussion of various theoretical frameworks through 
which organizations can be viewed and evaluated.   The next portion of my report will 
                                                
36 Daniel A. Levinthal, M. W. (1999, May-June). Landscape Design: Designing for Local Action in 
Complex Worlds. Organization Science , 10 (3), pp. 354. 
37 McDaniel, R. R. (2004). Chaos and Complexity in a Bioterrorism Future. In M. F. John Blair, 
Bioterrorism Preparedness, Attack and Response (Advances in Health Care Management) (Vol. 4, pp. 119-
139). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
38 Weick, K. E., & Roberts, K. H. (1993, Sept.). Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating 
on Flight Decks. Administrative Science Quarterly , 38 (3), pp. 357-381. 
 16 
attempt to draw on those theoretical approaches in order to come to a more 
comprehensive understanding of CAIU’s current performance measurement system. 
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Chapter III: CAIU in a Complex Adaptive Ethics Structure  
 
In order to come to a more effective model of performance measurement for 
CAIU, it is important to answer the following set of questions: What is the CAIU 
attempting to accomplish? Who are its customers?  What could be the potential indicators 
of CAIU success?  In order to do this, one must understand its role in the context of a 
wider system of ethics promotion in the City of Austin.    
Organizational Ethics: A Cornerstone of Governance 
A “governance” approach to organizations has brought with it a greater focus on 
organizational ethics.  To be considered a “best in class” program, an ethics structure is 
tasked with carrying out the prevention, detection, investigation, and lastly, correction of 
unethical behavior. 
Professional organizations such as the Association of Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
and the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) consider organizational controls to be the 
cornerstone of an effective compliance program. These controls are intended to minimize 
the occurrence of fraudulent or unethical behavior and include an ethical “tone at the 
top”, which must be articulated by management.  In addition, an organization must 
establish a mechanism for detecting wrongdoing when it occurs.   
A fraud hotline is considered to be an integral part of the detection element of an 
ethics and compliance structure, along with efforts at systematic fraud detection.  An 
investigative component, intended to prove or disprove suspected case of fraud, comprise 
the third pillar of detection.   
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Finally, a corrective component completes a comprehensive ethics and 
compliance program.  Effective correction is thought to consist first of a punitive aspect 
in the form of disciplinary action or criminal proceedings against individual wrongdoers, 
and second, relevant transformations of organizational processes or methods of 
management.  
COA City Ethics Structure 
The City of Austin attempts to prevent fraud and unethical behavior in a number 
of ways. The Integrity Officer and the Human Resources Department (HRD) are tasked 
with preventative activities that include citywide ethics training for employees.  While 
HRD ensures that all new City employees receive the requisite ethics training, the 
Integrity Office can be asked by department managers to train staff within their 
departments. Select individual departments also provide their own ethics training of 
employees.  
State and local laws, as well as the City’s code of ethics and relevant 
administrative bulletins, which originate from the City Manager and are approved by 
Council, all provide the policies guiding ethical standards and behavior, and many 
departments have also developed their own, ethical guidelines. 
The City attempts to detect fraud or unethical behavior through a number of 
channels in the City.  The detection of wrongdoing rests on the shoulders of individual 
employees, who are encouraged to report suspected integrity violations to their 
department managers, to HRD, or to the fraud hotline administered by CAIU within the 
City Auditor’s Office.  However, detection is the ultimate responsibility of individual 
departments, HRD, the Office of the City Auditor, as well as Corporate Internal Audit.  
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Several different entities within the City structure, including HRD, APD and 
CAIU, engage in investigative activities.  In the event that an integrity or ethics violation 
is substantiated, the involved party or parties may be subject to corrective action ranging 
from verbal or written reprimands to termination and possible criminal action.  An 
employee is placed on administrative leave during the course of an investigation, in 
which they are compensated but are prohibited from performing any City-related duties 
unless they are summoned to do so for the purposes of the investigation.  Corrective 
action is also a shared responsibility.  HRD carries out administrative action, as do 
individual departments.  The District Attorney’s Office is responsible for taking criminal 
ethics and integrity violations to court.  A formal grievance process, which is the purview 
of City Management, exists for all employees wishing to challenge corrective 
administrative action.   
The following section will further summarize the players involved in the City of 
Austin ethics structure: 
The Integrity Office 
In addition to providing voluntary training, the Integrity Office is responsible for writing 
and updating ethics-related policies and clarifying ethics-related issues. 
Human Resources Department (HRD) 
Personnel matters such as civil rights, equal employment or other types of grievances are 
under the jurisdiction of corporate HR.   
Law Department  
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The Law Department, headed by the City Attorney’s Office, is tasked with “interpreting 
and advising on legal matters.”39 
Austin Police Department (APD)  
A Criminal Investigation Unit within APD handles investigations of criminal violations 
of City employees.   
City Council 
The City Council sets priorities for personnel and ethics policies.   
Office of the City Auditor 
The Auditor’s Office is responsible for both the detection and prevention of ethics related 
misconduct.40  Through the CAIU, OCA administers a fraud hotline, conducts 
investigations and detection projects.  The office also participates in the fraud detection 
and prevention process by conducting an annual risk assessment of City entities, which 
could identify high-risk organizational subunits or processes within the City.41  In 
addition, the Yellow Book, the set of standards for the government auditing profession, 
requires auditors, when planning an audit, to “design the engagement to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting fraud, illegal acts, or violations of provisions.”42 
City Manager  
The City Manager is responsible for setting the overall ethical tone of the City.  This 
office also provides overall direction to the City of Austin’s management integrity/ethics 
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initiative” and “implements policy through administrative bulletins, standard operating 
procedures, and day-to-day management decisions.”43     
There are several coordinating bodies within the City Ethics structure.  The first is 
the Ethics Review Commission, which “Considers amendments to the Ethics 
Ordinance.”44  The second is The Management Integrity Committee (MIC).  This body 
has “ethics and integrity oversight responsibilities that allow direct communication and 
coordination between some of the entities involved in ethics management in the City.”45 
According to the 2007-2008 operating guidelines of the Commission, The City 
Auditor’s Office is responsible for  “presenting status reports on selected ongoing cases” 
and “presenting results of completed investigations” to the MIC. 46 APD as well as HRD 
are responsible for doing the same.  OCA, the City’s Integrity Officer, Corporal Internal 
Audit, and HRD are tasked with “suggesting potential remedies and referrals when 
investigations are completed as needed.”  Under its operating guidelines, HRD is also 
responsible for maintaining a citywide database “on cases involving integrity violations 
from inception until case disposition and implementation of remedies.”  This body is 
supposed to “define and oversee working relationships” between the actors within the 
structure and “develop citywide guidelines for case referrals.”47  
To judge the overall effectiveness of City efforts in the ethics promotion arena, an 
annual survey distributed to all City employees by HRD includes ten ethics related 
questions are intended to gauge the ethical climate of the City.   
                                                
43 Ibid 
44 (2010). City of Austin Annual Performance Report, 2009-2010. Austin: City of Austin Budget Office, p. 
35. 
45 Ibid 
46 Office of the City Auditor. Project Report: City of Austin Ethics Structure. 2008: City of Austin. 
47 Ibid. 
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After placing CAIU in a broader context, the next section will drill down to the 
work process of CAIU. 
The Work of CAIU 
Filtering allegations 
The Unit receives potential allegations through the fraud hotline, through an 
anonymous online reporting system, or via Auditor referral.  CAIU also receives 
allegations directly, if an employee or a citizen calls or emails the manager or one of the 
investigators.  Other City departments can also refer matters to the CAIU.  Not all 
potential allegations are acted on, for instance, such as ones that are clearly outside the 
scope of the Unit.   
Once an allegation is logged for action, it is reviewed, and a decision is made about 
whether it will be turned into a case or referred to the Austin Police Department (APD), 
HRD, to another City department, or referred to another entity outside of the City.  
Sometimes, allegations must be filtered through the City Attorney’s Office to determine 
the allegation’s disposition.    
Resolving Cases 
Once an allegation is determined to be within the scope of CAIU, the allegation 
becomes an open case.  If during the course of the investigation, it appears likely that a 
criminal violation may have occurred, the case is discussed first with the City Auditor, 
then with the Law Department, for a possible referral to APD.    
A case which is investigated to completion can have multiple results.  Most 
commonly, it can be deemed substantiated or unsubstantiated, but it can also be deemed 
inconclusive.  It can likewise be referred to APD or managers of relevant departments. 
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Reporting Results 
Lastly, after an investigation is completed, CAIU can report its findings through a 
number of different means.  It will either issue an official public report detailing the 
case’s results, or send written or verbal communication to relevant department managers.   
Complexities in the Investigative Process 
There are aspects of the investigation process that pose unique challenges to 
tracking performance information.  For instance, the point at which a referral may occur 
is a point of continuing discussion between the City Auditor, City Council, APD, and 
other relevant parties.  One of the complicating factors is the fact that employees are 
placed on administrative leave during the course of the investigation.  This calls for 
careful negotiation between the involved departments, as administrative and criminal 
priorities could potentially be in tension.  For instance, if a case is handled by CAIU in a 
timely fashion, it serves the administrative need of the City to stop the wrongdoing and 
mitigate losses to the City.  However, since criminal due process differs from civil 
investigative standards, cases investigated to completion by CAIU which uncover serious 
criminal activity could have the potential to undermine subsequent criminal investigation.  
If a successful completion of a case by CAIU leads to an informant confession, that 
confession is not enough to criminally prosecute the wrongdoer.  Therefore, the point of 
referral is a highly important point of system interdependence.   
Another such point in the investigative process is the process of follow through 
after a case is referred or completed.  Although CAIU does not issue recommendations, it 
sends signals to departments about the nature and seriousness of the offense, both 
explicitly and implicitly, through the means by which it communicates its findings.  The 
 24 
level of trust departments have in CAIU investigate process as well as the nature of the 
relationship between CAIU and that department as a result of perhaps past cases and 
interactions, will be a factor in influencing the corrective actions they want to implement.   
Overall, because of the nature of the system, small events in the investigative 
process can have non-proportionally large consequences.  For instance, overlooking one 
detail on one document has the potential to impact the results of a major investigation, 
serving to large disruptions within the entire City system.   At the same time, large inputs 
of effort, for instance, persuasive findings in a major case, could amount to proportionally 
insignificant results if a department manager chooses not to pursue corrective action.   
The investigation and corrective processes, carried out by multiple agents 
operating on their own fitness landscapes, is characterized by strong reciprocal 
interdependencies, which means “the outputs of each element become inputs for others 
and mutual adjustment is required for proper functioning.”48   
Complexity theory provides a useful way of viewing both the ethics structure and 
the subsequent design of a performance measurement system, by placing CAIU as an 
agent in the complex adaptive system of a wider ethics framework.   
The Ethics Structure as a CAS 
CAS theorists compare the flow of energy flowing through chemical systems to 
the flow of information that keeps a complex social system out of equilibrium.49  In the 
case of CAIU, large flows of information are both entering the system.  For instance, 
allegations are flowing in at unpredictable intervals.   New information from the Council, 
                                                
48 McDaniel, R. R. (2004). Chaos and Complexity in a Bioterrorism Future. In M. F. John Blair, 
Bioterrorism Preparedness, Attack and Response (Advances in Health Care Management) (Vol. 4, pp. 119-
139). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
49 Reichl, L. E. (2005). Fundamental “Uncertainty” in Science. In R. R. McDaniel, & D. Driebe (Eds.), 
Uncertainty and Surprise in Complex Systems (Vol. 4, pp. 71-76). Berlin: Springer. 
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City Management, various City Departments, and other stakeholders are also flow in and 
out at unpredictable intervals, thus adding to the entropy of CAIU.  In addition, as 
economic and political priorities change, so do both the input and outputs, of the Unit.   
System Interdependencies and Feedback Loops 
Factors outside of the Unit’s control, such as evolving city policies (i.e. the 
increased emphasis on ethics training and awareness) also impact the number and type of 
allegations reported to CAIU.  CAIU’s work is being guided by the input of outside 
stakeholders, but it also influenced the actions and policies of others. As previously 
illustrated, the information released by CAIU impacts the thought processes and actions 
of affected departments, and may impact City Management or Council action.  Those 
policies, for instance, may emphasize the strengthening of controls in one functional area 
of the City, which may lead to changes in employee behavior that are difficult to predict.   
After placing the CAIU in a wider context of a complex adaptive ethics structure, 
the report will move on to discuss the model of performance measurement currently 







Chapter IV: An Inside View of CAIU Performance 
 
This chapter will examine the current system of performance measurement system 
at CAIU.  Relying on data collected from staff and decision maker interviews and 
observation and drawing on the theoretical approaches discussed in previous chapters, it 
will provide an analysis on the potential of individual measures to improve performance, 
and draw conclusions about the unintended consequences that could be created by the 
current design.  It will also open a discussion on the prospects of employing additional 
measurement indicators. 
Austin’s Model of Performance Measurement  
To manage for results, the City of Austin asks departmental units to categorize its 
services into “activities,” and to provide various categories of indicators for ascertaining 
both their effectiveness and efficiency. Each activity is tasked with providing information 
about the demand for its services, its outputs, as well as the indicators of outcomes, or 
results, of service efforts. Below is a discussion of how each of these categories are 
tracked at CAIU. 
Tracking Demand 
Demand indicators are concerned with tracking requested or expected levels of 
services requested by the customers of each activity.  CAIU tracks “the demand for 
investigative services” via a measure of “the number of cases received.”50  
                                                





Although this is one aspect of CAIU demand, the current system does not account 
for the number of allegations that are received by the unit.  However, this measure is 
recently tracked internally. 
Measuring Output 
Indicators of output are “units of services provided, products provided or people 
served through the activity; outputs are counts of the goods and services produced or 
delivered.”  CAIU officially reports outputs, or the amount of work completed, through 
three indicators: “number of cases worked”, “number of integrity projects worked,” and 
“number of cases worked.”  These outputs are judged against system inputs to create 
ratios of efficiency. 
Number of cases investigated to completion  
Intended to measure “the amount of work the investigations group has been able 
to complete,” this measure is useful for decision makers to determine the amount of 
allegations deemed substantial enough to investigate.  However, it provides little 
information on the magnitude or type of investigations that were conducted.  Therefore, if 
it is not an accurate representation of “work completed.”   
In addition, this measure includes a target despite the fact that CAIU cannot 
control neither the number of allegations is received, nor the number of allegations that 
become cases.  This has several implications.  On the one hand, assigning a target to the 
number of cases could impact the payoff structures of investigators in the decision to turn 
allegations into cases.  However, the negative payoffs for not pursuing a case, both from 
the point of view of potential ramifications, and from the point of view of personal 
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investigator integrity, are too strong for this target to have any real potential for a 
perverse effect.   
Number of other integrity projects worked  
This measure provides a proposed proxy for the amount of work completed on 
other detection or follow through activities.  As was the case with the previous measure, 
it provides little information about the magnitude, nature or effectiveness of those 
activities.   
In addition, a set target, or on average, one OIP a quarter, is particularly 
problematic from the perspective of incentivizing performance.  First, considering the 
unpredictable nature of the Unit’s inputs, the fixed nature of the target has the potential to 
create pressures to take on less labor intensive, and not necessarily high value added 
projects. 
Reporting Results 
 Result indicators are intended to demonstrate the outcomes of the services 
provided by the unit in question.  CAIU currently reports its outcomes through three main 
indicators.  A more comprehensive discussion of these measures is included below. 
Percent of investigations completed within 60 days of initiation  
This measure tracks the ratio of cases completed within a two month timeframe 
out of the cases currently considered completed. Established prior to the tenure of the 
current decision makers, it is nevertheless considered a fair benchmark for typical 
investigations, since CAIU must often rely on information or cooperation from other 
parties.   In addition, the measure appears to have operational utility.  The manager, for 
instance, considers it useful for both “managing the clock,” prioritizing workload, and for 
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examining why investigations go long.  The manager says he looks at underperforming 
cases to reflect on underlying causes.   
Council satisfaction 
Intended to show the average level of satisfaction experienced by what is 
considered CAIU’s primary customer, the measure is based on a survey with the 
following questions, asking respondents to respond on a rating scale of 1 to 4:   
1) The value of the information OCA provides to you in your role as a policy maker 
2) The value of the information OCA provides to you in your role as a policy maker 
3) OCA's contribution to improved accountability and transparency in City 
Government 
4) Your overall satisfaction with: Audit Services 
5) Your overall satisfaction with: Integrity Services 
 
The absence of descriptors anchoring the rating scale limits its useful to decision 
makers for gauging Council satisfaction, as it provides no further information to help a 
decision maker make sense of Council’s views.  Without more detailed explanatory 
information, how would a decision maker determine the difference in satisfaction 
between a 3.5 and a 3.67?  Currently, there are discussions underway expanding the scale 
to a 1-5 system.  However, this is not likely to ameliorate the fundamental problem unless 
the survey is expanded to include more targeted questions.    
A broader view of stakeholder satisfaction  
CAIU staff have raised the issue of measuring satisfaction of other stakeholders in 
the process.  These stakeholders include other departments or informants or witnesses 
touched by investigative work.  However, within a CAS, and within the Ethics Structure, 
the issue of stakeholder satisfaction becomes more problematic, as departments, some of 
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which may be negatively impacted or may disagree with the outcomes of certain 
investigations, would become the arbiters of CAIU “results”.  
Percent of investigations completed where needed corrective action occurs 
Sometimes referred to within the unit as “the accountability action” measure, this 
measure is intended to account for “positive actions taken as a result of the integrity 
services activity investigation of cases.” 51 Accountability actions are defined to be 
actions “taken by management and/or outside parties which improve or reinforce internal 
controls and/or hold employees or contractors accountable for expectations.”  The extent 
to which this measure is an effective indicator of CAIU performance is a topic of 
controversy within the Unit.  This is not surprising, since it encompasses some of the 
most important questions and contradictions in the performance measurement debate.   
Several complications arise when viewing this measure for its ability to reflect the 
efficacy of CAIU activities.  First, since CAIU does not issue recommendations about 
corrective action to departments, there is debate on whether it is any useful indication of 
performance.  As one investigator pointed out, “there is an ebb and flow to departmental 
relationships.”  In other words, other external influences may impact both the severity 
and the timing of management corrective action. 
However, it was articulated that the measure should not be discounted as an 
indicator of effectiveness, since it gives some insight into the persuasiveness of both the 
evidence and the argument presented to departments.  The influence piece is an 
interesting consideration from the perspective of CAS, as it could be one way of 
                                                





ascertaining information about the nature of relationships, and the level of trust, that 
exists between CAIU and the departments, which could be particularly useful for the 
purposes of Unit sense making and consequent adaptation.   
Considering the need for richer information for decision-making, it is significant 
to note that the measure doesn’t capture whether the corrective action that occurred was 
appropriate given the nature of the offense.  From this perspective, this is a vital missing 
piece in the CAIU performance measurement system, as without further explanatory data, 
it inhibits upper level decision makers from ascertaining the extent to which the problem 
was really addressed. 
The controversial nature of the measure itself, however, has the potential to 
actually improve desired outcomes.  Since this measure’s collection encourages CAIU to 
follow up with department management, it provides more opportunities to both establish 
relationships and to encourage accountability from the departments involved.  
Additionally, this measure spurs staff discussion over the timing, extent and even 
existence of a corrective action, and is a big motivating factor for why performance 
measures are prepared as a team.  Therefore, it would please CAS theorists to hear that it 
creates opportunities for reflections on past cases and has the potential to foster 
organizational learning.      
Measuring Efficiency 
Currently, the unit officially reports two measures of efficiency: “Cost per 
investigation worked” and “Cost per other integrity project worked.” Intended to be a 
measure of average cost of each type of activity, the measure is calculated by a ratio of 
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the total number of hours spent on investigation activity divided by the total number of 
each case or OIP.   
In managing for results, efficiency measures are an integral part of government 
performance.  CAIU is a structure which is mainly focused on reliability, since mistakes 
can lead to the damage of reputations, losses to the City, and to wide political and even 
criminal implications.  In contexts that require perpetual reliability, CAS theorists 
underline the particular importance of collective mind, characterized by heedful 
interrelations, which decrease the amount of errors in organizations.52  The authors argue 
that unlike organizations that are concerned with efficiency, organizations that focus on 
reliability “spend more time and effort organizing for controlled information processing, 
mindful attention and heedful action.”53 This would discourage a further focus on setting 
more stringent efficiency targets.  
Potential Additional Indicators  
During interviews, various questions were posed to staff to determine what other 
measures should be considered for ascertaining CAIU effectiveness. Below is a summary 
and an analysis of their responses. 
Timeliness of referrals  
The timeliness of referrals was mentioned to be an important informal indicator of 
unit performance.   
Measures of departmental relationships 
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53 Ibid 
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Echoing the recommendations that might be made by a CAS theorist, staff also 
consistently named relationships with departments to be important measures of desired 
outcomes; they mentioned direct referrals from HR or other departments as one specific 
indication that the relationships are in place for the emergence of more optimal system 
outcomes.  Another noted indicator was the extent to which others were turning to CAIU 
for thought leadership or knowledge sharing, or whether departments were seeking CAIU 
training or technical assistance.  For instance, an investigator mentioned departments 
asking for help with interviewing skills as one measure that CAIU are seen as experts of 
their craft.  One CAIU staff member mentioned the increased level of employees calling 
CAIU directly (instead of anonymously on the hotline) as another indicator that the Unit 
is doing its job.  A second investigator echoed this sentiment, adding, “When people 
reach out, it means they are confident that we can get things done.”  The investigator 
added, poignantly, that from the staff perspective, success extends “beyond the number of 
reports that we issue.” 
In summary, considering both CAS, as well as insider staff perspectives, measures 
indicating the credibility and perceived effectiveness of CAIU, both by employees and by 
other departments, might be one potential means of addressing an existing gap in the 
performance measurement system.  These measures could include, for instance, tracking 
trends in the number of direct referrals received from departments, or the number of 
training/knowledge requests received.  These might be a good measure to help the CAIU 





Chapter V: Findings and Recommendations 
 
This chapter will synthesize observations and analysis from previous chapters to 
make recommendations about the design and use of performance measurement in the 
CAIU.  This is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the system.  Rather, the focus of this chapter is to consider the issues most salient to the 
previous discussion on incentives, organizational design, and the challenges of 
accountability, and to make some conclusions about the challenges of performance 
measurement. 
This report has argued that a decision maker’s frame of reference, or ultimate 
purpose for measurement, cannot be ignored in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of 
a performance measurement system. Therefore, this chapter will consider the merits of 
current and future merits with differing decision-maker frameworks in mind. 
First, if the goal of measurement is to enforce a sense of accountability, from both 
a logical and an equity perspective, the model should capture, as accurately as possible, 
the inputs, outputs, and potential outcomes of the system.  From this perspective, CAIU’s 
current model of performance measurement has a number of weaknesses.  First, if we are 
to be faithful to the accountability approach to MFR, then we have to conclude that the 
measures of output do not adequately capture the entire scope of work of the CAIU.  A 
closer fit would entail output measures capturing the entire gamut of the CAIU’s 
activities.  For instance, the “number of referrals issued” would be an important outcome 
measure under a traditional MFR framework.  In addition, it fails to account for important 
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stakeholder groups, including the departments with which it has dealings as well as 
employees reporting allegations in its measures of satisfaction.   
Additionally, if we are to consider the system from the perspective of incentive 
design, several facets of the system have the potential to actually undermine CAIU 
performance.  For example, the existence of a set target for other integrity projects 
completed, in a system where other work is variable, creates disincentives for 
undertaking complex and time-consuming projects.  In order to incent a focus on projects 
that might be of greatest benefit to the City, the performance structure would have to be 
better aligned with the realities of Unit operations.  For instance, allowing the unit to 
choose the timing and number of projects it chooses to undertake, with a mutually agreed 
upon target for project type, scope, or cost, would give CAIU more flexibility on resource 
use, while incentivizing a potentially better outcome in the area of fraud prevention and 
detection.   
If a decision maker believes that employees will conform to the least common 
denominator, and this is a view that CAS theorists believe has been the traditional mode 
of thought underlying organizational design, than one might assume that in the case of 
CAIU, the 60 day measure would create disincentives for performance.  For example, an 
MFR strategist might say that without a complementary measure of stakeholder 
satisfaction about timeliness54, little incentive exists for an investigator to complete an 
easy case in three days, when they have nearly two months to meet their mark.  
Additionally, they would presume, once the 60-day deadline has passed, there is no 
incentive to rush to complete a case in a timely fashion.  However, a more comprehensive 
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view of incentives would recognize that investigators are motivated by much more than 
meeting a performance target on a daily basis.  Variables such as managerial motivation, 
unit expectations and the dynamics of team processes, constantly  shift the landscape of 
multiple payoffs for CAIU staff.  Considering the perverse incentives that may be created 
if more stringent targets for case closure time are set, one has to question the utility of 
taking such a step.   
On setting efficiency targets 
 
Building on the discussion above, CAIU does not currently set efficiency targets 
for the number of hours spent per investigation.  It is widely acknowledged that setting 
meaningful and appropriate targets may be difficult because of the nature of the 
investigative process.  In addition, a CAS view of organizations would say that it would 
be much more useful to instill processes which encourage organizational learning through 
the discussion of case outcomes at the end of investigations to discern whether the 
amount of hours spent on a particular project were worth the outcomes, than to set targets 
for their completion.  This view underlies a belief that employers may be intrinsically 
motivated to do well, and are able to learn processes that enable them to learn from the 
past for better outcomes in the future.   
Quality of agent relationships 
 
 As previously discussed, the City of Austin Ethics Structure has a large number 
of interdependencies, and therefore from a CAS view, a large number of potential 
outcomes of performance.  If we are to buy in to the notion that the nature of these 
interdependencies are a main determinant of system performance, then one would 
consider a set of indicators which would capture the quality of relationships between 
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CAIU and the Audit side, as well as among CAIU, APD, the Law Department, HRD, as 
well as between CAIU and every City department.  This could theoretically be 
accomplished through a set of well-designed survey questions targeted at measuring 
satisfaction with certain key facets of performance.  However, there would have to be a 
reciprocal exchange of information.  For instance, surveying APD about their satisfaction 
with the timeliness of CAIU allegation referral would only make sense if CAIU was also 
surveyed about their satisfaction with timeliness of response from the departments with 
which they have dealings.   
Tracking operational data 
 
A CAS view of organizations would place an emphasis on the tracking of 
information for the purpose of sensemaking and learning for organizational improvement.  
CAS thinking would argue against, however, the codification of permanent measures.  
Since organizational fitness landscapes are ever-changing, from a CAS view of the world, 
measures might need to be periodically, or even frequently, redesigned to better reflect 
the landscape.  However, this runs contrary to the MFR principles of consistency in 
measures for the purpose of multi-year comparisons.  After all, how are managers to be 
evaluated, if managerial accountability is a key purpose of measurement?  From a CAS 
perspective, it would appear that performance measurement under an MFR framework 
promotes accountability at the expense of performance.    
Useful system indictors 
 
A more holistic discussion of indicators with consideration to operational utility 
for the City of Austin, holding fixed other concerns, entails broadening the unit of 
analysis to the entire Ethics Structure, even beyond just components of investigative 
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services.  Although not an extensive body of literature exists on the “best practices” of 
performance measurement within individual fraud units, the little that exists tends to 
emphasize this systems approach.  On the one hand, best practices literature emphasizes 
the unique nature of investigative work and variability of its outcomes, and on the other, 
proposes that organizations focus on tracking a few key measures, which are discussed in 
more detail below.  
Case resolution by workload disaggregation 
 
A measure of issue resolution time, broken down by case category, is the first 
“best-in-class” indicator in the field.  The disaggregation by type of case, is 
recommended so as not to create perverse incentives for rushing through an 
investigation.55 Hatry and other MFR theorists have also recommended this approach. In 
the context of CAIU, for instance, cases could be categorized by various characteristics 
including workload or complexity (number of informants or departments involved), scale 
or sensitivity, etc.   
Not holding other variables context, however, becomes more problematic.  When 
the need for accountability is factored in, the reporting the results of cases by difficulty to 
outside decision makers less familiar with the complexities inherent in the process would 
be at best extremely frustrating and time consuming, and at most, futile.  The difficulty 
would come in during the characterization process.   How many hours would it take to 
decide on whether a case was simple, medium or complex?  One could use the number of 
suspects as differentiators, or departments involved.  As time consuming as it would be to 
agree on a set of definitions and characterizations, and how would one appropriate 
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quantify, for the purposes of reporting, the sensitivity of a case?  On the other hand, as 
mentioned earlier, if this type of reporting creates opportunities for teams to come 
together and hash out case types, there is value to be gained in those types of discussions.  
However, depending on the decision maker to which the information is ultimately 
reported, and his or her views of measurement as well as motivation to understand the 
process, the value gained from learning from categorization may or may not outweigh the 
time spent on the effort.   
Tracking repeat incidents 
 
The fraud literature also recommends tracking repeat incidents in an organization, 
which seems a very important and reasonable measure for decision makers to be able to 
make sense of how the ethics environment is changing.  Of course, it wouldn’t be useful 
for attempting to assign causation for whatever changes in trend data might be observed.   
The fraud literature also stresses that units have a flexible approach to measurement, and 
to consider resource availability and other organizational factors and types of cases on 
which the fraud unit works, which is consistent with a CAS view, and recommends a  
menu of potential indicators. 56  I have pulled the ones not currently in operation at CAIU 
below: 
The timeliness of implementation of remediation plans. 
Timeliness in implementing additional controls to prevent new 
frauds. 
 Assessment of the likelihood that frauds perpetrated against other 
organizations in the same industry will occur in the organization. 
 Comparison of fraud versus complaints, grievances, etc., via 
hotline calls. 
 
Building Trust for Richer Performance Reporting 
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Although the issue of reporting was not fully discussed in this report, the topic of 
reporting cannot be ignored in the discussion of performance management, particularly as 
seen through a Complexity lens. Complexity theory as well as current approaches to 
performance management through the MFR framework align in their advocacy of richer 
explanatory data in the reporting of results and accomplishments to higher level decision 
makers and consequently, to citizens. However, After all, principals must trust that agents 
will provide data that is both accurate and comprehensive, and agents must trust that their 
principals will evaluate them fairly.  In the principal agent relationship between populace 
and government, the balance between trust and verification gets to the heart of debates 
surrounding performance measurement.   In the absence of that trust, incentives exist for 
agents to highlight only stellar measures of performance.  When that trust is diminished, a 
performance management system becomes more focused on accountability.  In the 
absence of its artful design, however, it becomes potentially less able to deliver the 
results it seeks.   
Concluding Thoughts 
Although this report has suggested potential indicators of effective CAIU 
performance, it has far from provided a definitive answer to the problem of 
recommending the set of measures to be used for official reporting.   Instead, my 
argument remains, “it depends.”   
Two systems thinkers provide an eloquent summation of the challenges of 
building a model of performance: “To be able to accommodate the multitude of purposes 
to which it is likely to be put, a model of government management must elegantly capture 
a complex web of relationships, but must also permit variation to be identified along 
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specific, meaningful dimensions.”57 Somewhat ironically, it seems that the final 
determination of the worthiness of the endeavor of designing and implementing such a 
system depends on one’s view of the ultimate reasons behind measuring and reporting 
performance.    
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